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1 Introduction
There are two main empirical approaches to the explanation of wage behaviour. First,
the dynamic Phillips curve, giving a negative relationship between wage growth and
the unemployment rate, has a prominent role in the empirical literature. The second
approach is the dynamic wage curve, which gives a negative long-run relationship
between the wage level and the unemployment rate. The empirical evidence favours
the Phillips curve specification for the US, while wage curve specifications dominate the
European literature. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) in particular have made a strong
case for the wage curve as a general phenomenon. While they also report wage-curve
specifications on US data, their results are refuted by Blanchard and Katz (1997).
Blanchard and Katz (1997, 1999) provide an elegant attempt at reconciling the
conflicting evidence by utilizing the fact that the Phillips curve is nested within the
wage-curve specification. This makes it easy to discriminate between the two models
econometrically. To illustrate their point, consider the following stylized wage-curve
specified as an Equilibrium Correction model (EqCM):
∆wt = a+∆pct + α∆qt − δut − α [w − pc− q]t−1 + εt, (1)
where the variables are nominal hourly earnings W , labour productivity Q, the unem-
ployment rate U, and retail prices PC. Small letters denote natural logarithms of the
corresponding variables denoted in capitals, so xt ≡ lnXt and growth rates are given
as ∆xt ≡ xt − xt−1. Blanchard and Katz (1999) argue that
α = (1− µλ) , 0 ≤ {µ, λ} ≤ 1
where (1− λ) is the direct eﬀect of productivity on the expected real wage, and (1− µ)
is the direct eﬀect of productivity on the reservation wage. Thus, if there are no eﬀects
from productivity, so that µ = λ = 1, the EqCM-term [w − pc− q]t−1 drops out and
the Phillips-curve specification remains.
Blanchard and Katz (1999) argue that underlying labour market conditions and
institutional settings are the crucial determinants of wage behaviour and that there are
systematic structural diﬀerences between Europe and the United States. Productivity
eﬀects on wages are assumed to be higher in Europe than in the US, which implies a
small magnitude of µ and λ. This explains the presence of an EqCM-term in European
equations. The small magnitude of µ is related to the greater role of unions and more
stringent hiring and firing regulations in the European labour markets. The smaller
magnitude of the European λ could be due to a bigger underground or alternative
economy, although the evidence here is less well documented. Amore general statement
is perhaps that λ will be higher the weaker the rights of workers, and that µ will be
higher the more diverse forms the total labour market can take.
During the depression years of the interwar period, European manufacturing work-
ers were often in danger of losing their jobs due to business cycle fluctuations. Em-
ployment protection and worker rights in Europe were much weaker than has been the
case in postwar years, and the social security system was not nearly as well developed
as is the case in modern Europe. Alternative employment opportunities in informal
labour markets were largely non-existing; some employment could be found in agricul-
ture and fishing, but only paid subsistence wages. In many respects interwar European
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labour markets possess features that are closer to American labour settings than to
present-day European markets. Empirical analysis of European labour markets in the
interwar years may thus provide a new and interesting evidence on the two conflicting
hypotheses. According to the explanation given by Blanchard and Katz (1999), we
should expect to find a Phillips-curve rather than a wage curve, when looking at Euro-
pean data for the interwar years. On the other hand, if the wage curve model emerges
as the best specification, this suggests that other theories are called for in order to
explain the diﬀerent behaviour in US wage setting compared to Europe.
When looking at the evidence from the interwar period, the empirical wage equa-
tions from this period appear to be somewhat fragile. For the United Kingdom Hatton
(1988), Dimsdale et al. (1989) and Broadberry (1986) estimated several wage equa-
tions for the interwar years, including a wage-bargain model and a Phillips-curve type
of model, using quarterly time series data, but no empirically well-specified model, was
obtained. The results from other European countries reported by Newell and Symons
(1988) are somewhat more in line with standard wage equations than is the case for
Britain, but even here there is only a weak feedback from unemployment to the real
wage. One explanation for these conflicting empirical findings may be that wage for-
mation in interwar labour markets was indeed diﬀerent from the postwar period, so
Blanchard and Katz (1999) are correct. Data from the United States indicate that
there was a change in the cyclical behaviour of real wages between the interwar period
and the postwar years.1 This fact does not necessarily imply that there were changes
in the structural parameters of labour demand and supply equations, however. Such
changes might for example stem from diﬀerences in the relative magnitudes of labour
demand and supply shocks in the two time periods.2.
In this paper we report empirical evidence on interwar wage equations for one
European country, Norway, using GMM estimation methods. Our purpose is twofold:
we would like to show that theoretically plausible and econometrically sound wage
equations can be found for the interwar period as well, once a more powerful data set
is available and the proper estimation methods are applied. If this can be achieve we
will be able to test the hypothesis of Blanchard and Katz (1999)–that the existence of
a wage curve is dependent upon the presence of modern ‘European’ type labour market
settings.
Most previous studies have been poorly equipped to identify a stable and well
identified relationship, being confined to use the relatively small samples of time series
data available for the interwar years. Even quarterly data, typically over a period of at
most 15 years, may provide a relatively poor basis for identifying stable relationships,
given the varying data quality of the key variables during the period.3
The novel feature of our approach is to estimate standard wage equations using a
panel data set recently constructed by Klovland (1999) for Norwegian manufacturing.
Panel data estimation is likely to provide more information than time series estimation
1See Bernanke and Powell (1986) and Hanes (1996) for evidence on the changing cyclicality of real
wages.
2On the other hand, Hanes (1996) rejected the hypothesis of relative changes in demand and supply
shocks in favour of an explanation in terms of a shift towards more finished goods in the consumption
bundle of consumers, making the real consumption wage more procyclical over time.
3The fact that Bernanke (1986) obtained quite well-behaved real earnings equations using US
monthly manufacturing data of relatively high quality from the interwar period may indicate that
better data may be of some importance.
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over a relatively short sample period, since we can draw inference from the cross-
section variation in the data in addition to the time series volatility of the early 1930s.
The data base contains annual values of key output and labour market variables for
55 manufacturing industries over the period 1927 to 1939: nominal average hourly
earnings, producer price indices, labour productivity (real value added per hour) and,
at a somewhat less disaggregated level, unemployment rates.
Section 2 briefly presents the general model, which is suﬃciently general to encom-
pass wage behaviour in this period. Section 3 reviews some features of interwar labour
markets in Norway that are of specific relevance to the theories examined here. We re-
port the empirical modelling of the wage equation for the years 1927 - 1939 in Sections
4 to 6, focussing on the economic interpretation of the results as well as methodological
issues related to estimation methods. A fuller discussion of the methodological issues
is contained in Appendix A, where we present some new Monte Carlo evidence on the
properties of the estimators used.
2 The wage equation
A general dynamic specification, nesting that of Blanchard and Katz (1999) above, is
(1− α1L)wit = (β0 + β1L) pit + (γ0 + γ1L) qit
+(δ0 + δ1L)uit + (ζ0 + ζ1L) pct + ηi + εit. (2)
The variables are (logs of) nominal hourly earnings w, producer prices p, labour pro-
ductivity q, the unemployment rate u, and retail prices pc.4 The letter L denotes the
lag operator, defined by Lxit = xi(t−1). Hence wit denotes the logarithm of the nominal
wage in the i0th industry in period t. The variables pit, qit and uit are industry-specific
variables, while economy-wide eﬀects that are not transmitted through the unemploy-
ment rate, say, are captured by the retail price index pct.
Nominal wage growth responds positively to increases in producer and retail prices,
labour productivity, and negatively to increased unemployment. A natural property
of a wage equation is that in the long run the nominal wage level is homogenous of
degree one with respect to the two price variables (industry-specific output prices and
general retail prices), but that there is some degree of wage level stickiness in the short
run. A key hypothesis, subjected to empirical testing below, is that productivity
growth increases real wages in the same proportion in the long run. The equivalent to
Blanchard and Katz’ model in (1) is the EqCM reparameterization of (2):
∆wit = β0∆pit + γ0∆qit + δ0∆uit + ζ0∆pct − α1 (w − w∗)i(t−1) + ηi + εit, (3)
where ∆xit = xit − xi(t−1) and w∗it is the steady-state wage level
w∗it =
µ
β0 + β1
1− α1
¶
pit +
µ
γ0 + γ1
1− α1
¶
qit +
µ
δ0 + δ1
1− α1
¶
ut +
µ
ζ0 + ζ1
1− α1
¶
pct
= β∗pit + γ∗qit + δ
∗ut + ζ
∗pct. (4)
Price level homogeneity requires that β∗ + ζ∗ = 1. We also test the long-run pro-
portionality assumption of labour productivity, γ∗ = 1. Institutional and structural
4We disregard tax rates, which were rather low during the interwar period.
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features are reflected in the coeﬃcients of (4). Changes in the impact of institutions
on wage setting can therefore be tested by looking at the empirical stability of (4) over
the sample period. It is quite likely that wages interact simultaneously with all the
explanatory variables. In the present setting, however, we would like to focus on the
behaviour of wages. We do, of course, take the possible simultaneity into account when
estimating the model by using instrumental variables.
3 Some features of the interwar labour market in
Norway
After a deflationary period in the mid 1920s Norway was back on the gold standard at
the prewar parity in May 1928.5 Manufacturing output, which is shown in figure 2,
was significantly aﬀected by the international depression beginning in the autumn of
1929. The output level of 1929 was not surpassed until 1934, but even this five-year
growth pause was a reasonably good performance relative to other countries. The fact
that Norway followed pound sterling and went oﬀ the gold standard in September 1931
may be a key factor here, as suggested by the international cross-section analysis in
Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). In the second half of the 1930s manufacturing output
recovered quite well, very much in line with other Scandinavian countries and other
Sterling block countries.6 Increasing labour productivity and capital deepening im-
plied that output could expand significantly without leading to any shortage of labour.
Although unemployment went down somewhat in the latter half of the 1930s, it was
still high among trade union members in manufacturing at the end of the decade.
5Klovland (1998) contains some background on the monetary policy in the interwar years.
6See Klovland (1997) for new data on manufacturing output in Norway and some international
comparisons.
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Figure 2: Manufacturing output 1927-1939. 1929=100.
A general scheme of unemployment insurance for manufacturing workers guaran-
teed by the government was not established until 1938.7 Before 1938 only members of
trade unions that oﬀered unemployment schemes were entitled to unemployment ben-
efits. About one third of trade union members did not have access to such schemes.
The amounts paid were fairly constant in real terms over the period and quite low,
amounting only to about one third of the general wage level in manufacturing. Gryt-
ten (2000, p. 34) concludes that ‘it is not likely that the unemployment benefits paid
to insured trade unionists gave any significant incentive to stay unemployed’. Fur-
thermore, the level of unionization was relatively modest, roughly one of four workers
in manufacturing were trade union members. Unorganized manufacturing workers or
those who were members of unions that did not have unemployment schemes were
forced to seek public relief work in case of unemployment. Such employment was of
short duration and poorly paid, being about the same level as unemployment benefits
from trade unions. Thus reservation wages were fairly constant at a low level, and
apparently not very sensitive to productivity increases, which is the crucial link in the
theory considered here.
7Information on labour market instutions is from Grytten (2000).
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Figure 3: Box-Whiskers plots of nominal wages, real wages, wage shares and unem-
ployment in industries per year.
Figure 7 describes the distributions of diﬀerent wage measures and the unemploy-
ment rates across the 55 manufacturing industries in the years 1927 to 1939 by means
of box-whiskers plots.8 The distributions of nominal wages remains fairly constant dur-
ing the depression. The median displays considerable downward rigidity, rising back
towards pre-depression levels in the late thirties. Real product wages show somewhat
more dispersion across industries during depression years–but notably so in terms of
observed high real wages in some industries. Real wage rigidity is even more pronounced
than nominal rigidity. Labour’s share of income also displays the same surprisingly
stable pattern over the period. Hence, if real wages and wage shares did not exhibit
any appreciable downward movements, we would expect that labour demand to vary
quite a lot – which it does. The lower right panel shows how the unemployment rates
increase both in general and across industries as the depression hits the economy, before
unemployment rates again fall towards the end of the period. The same impression of
a strong recession is reflected in the behaviour of retail prices, shown in figure 4.
8The lower and upper limits of the box are the 25 and 75 percentiles, while the horizontal lines inside
the box denotes the median. The whiskers denote the upper and lower adjacent observations. If x75
and x25 are the 75 and 25 percentile observations, then observations bigger than x75+ 3/2 (x75 − x25)
and smaller than x25 − 3/2 (x75 − x25) are outside the adjacent values (and are marked as outside
values).
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Figure 4: Retail price index, 1929=100.
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Figure 5: Means plus/minus two standard errors of product wage shares and unem-
ployment rates across industries over the sample.
The impression of wage rigidity is further reinforced when we compare retail prices
with the means of wage shares and unemployment rates, shown in figure 5. While
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Table 1: The diﬀerent specifications considered
Equations GMM instruments Anderson & Hsiao
instruments
Diﬀ Diﬀerenced wit−2, wit−3 pct, pct−1, pit, pit−1,
qit, qit−1, uit, uit−1
Diﬀ-end Diﬀerenced wit−2, wit−3, pit−2, pit−3, pct, pct−1
qit−2, qit−3, uit−2, uit−3
Sys Diﬀerenced wit−2, wit−3, ∆wit−1 pct, pct−1, pit, pit−1,
& levels qit, qit−1, uit, uit−1
Sys-end Diﬀerenced wit−2, wit−3, pit−2, pit−3, pct, pct−1
& levels qit−2, qit−3, uit−2, uit−3
∆wit−1,∆pit−1,∆qit−1,∆uit−1
Note: The Anderson & Hsiao instruments enter as diﬀerences or levels according
to the transformation in use.
retail prices fall heavily, inflation being positive only after 1933, the mean of labour’s
share of product income is virtually constant. The mean of the unemployment rates,
on the other hand, doubles from 1930 to 1931.
4 Testing specifications
The wage equations are estimated using both the GMM estimator of Arellano and
Bond (1991) and the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). Both estimators allow control for the presence of un-
observed industry-specific eﬀects and for the possible endogeneity of the explanatory
variables. Both GMM estimators use equations in first-diﬀerences to eliminate the
industry-specific fixed eﬀects. Endogenous variables in levels lagged two or more peri-
ods will be valid instruments, provided there is no autocorrelation in the time-varying
component of the error terms. This is tested by examining tests for serial correlation
in the first-diﬀerenced residuals, following Arellano and Bond (1991). For the system
GMM estimator, the diﬀerenced equations–using level instruments–are combined
with equations in levels–using diﬀerences as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998)
show that first diﬀerences of the series may be uncorrelated with the industry-specific
eﬀects in the case of stationary series. We therefore use lagged diﬀerences for the vari-
ables as instruments for the levels equations. In the specifications labelled Diﬀ and
Sys the following variables are considered exogenous: productivity qi, producer prices
pi, and unemployment ui. In the specifications labelled Diﬀ-end and Sys-end the same
variables are treated as endogenous. In all specifications the retail price index is treated
as exogenous. The validity of the instruments are in each case tested by means of the
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The exact specifications considered for the
diﬀerent wage equations are given in Table 1.
To avoid overfitting, and thus cancel the eﬀects of instrumenting, we keep the
number of instruments fixed as the number of time periods increases.
The results are generated using Ox version 3.2 (see Doornik, 1999) and the DPD
package (Doornik et al., 1999). The estimated wage equations using the diﬀerent
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Table 2: Wage equations, GMM estimates
Dep. var: wit Diﬀ Diﬀ-end Sys Sys-end
wit−1 0.17
(0.12)
0.26
(0.10)
0.71
(0.05)
0.85
(0.05)
pit 0.06
(0.05)
−0.01
(0.09)
0.03
(0.07)
−0.10
(0.10)
pit−1 0.04
(0.05)
0.08
(0.09)
0.02
(0.06)
0.17
(0.11)
qit 0.14
(0.05)
0.19
(0.07)
0.13
(0.05)
0.11
(0.07)
qit−1 0.06
(0.04)
0.04
(0.05)
−0.05
(0.04)
0.008
(0.05)
uit 0.001
(0.01)
0.007
(0.01)
0.013
(0.016)
0.013
(0.013)
uit−1 −0.02
(0.01)
−0.04
(0.01)
−0.03
(0.01)
−0.04
(0.01)
pct 0.18
(0.13)
0.13
(0.19)
0.86
(0.14)
0.94
(0.13)
pct−1 0.40
(0.17)
0.33
(0.20)
−0.66
(0.13)
−0.83
(0.14)
Diagnostics
Sargan test: χ2 (·) 38.01∗∗ (20) 53.49 (77) 50.97∗ (31) 52.62 (121)
AR (1) test: N (0, 1) −1.38 −2.54∗ −3.97∗∗ −4.05∗∗
AR (2) test: N (0, 1) −1.40 −1.37 0.49 0.17
Steady-state analysis: w∗it = β
∗pit + γ∗qit + δ
∗ut + ζ
∗pct
β∗ 0.12
(0.07)
0.10
(0.14)
0.17
(0.24)
0.51
(0.52)
γ∗ 0.24
(0.07)
0.31
(0.11)
0.28
(0.20)
0.79
(0.41)
δ∗ −0.024
(0.016)
−0.05
(0.02)
−0.07
(0.06)
−0.19
(0.10)
ζ∗ 0.69
(0.08)
0.61
(0.15)
0.73
(0.26)
0.71
(0.53)
Testing steady-state restrictions
β∗ + ζ∗ = 1 12.61∗∗ 16.90∗∗ 0.28 0.41
β∗ + ζ∗ = 1, γ∗ = 1 128.09∗∗ 46.39∗∗ 13.97∗∗ 0.95
β∗ + ζ∗ = 1, γ∗ = 1, δ∗ = −0.1 246.30∗∗ 102.33∗∗ 27.16∗∗ 1.80
specifications are reported in Table 2.
We report results using the two-step estimators, with standard errors and test
statistics that are asymptotically robust to general heteroskedasticity, see Windmeijer
(2000).
All specifications seem to capture the relevant dynamics, since no second order
residual correlation is evident. A general impression is that the system estimators
produce more reasonable estimates than the first diﬀerence estimators. The diﬀerences
are in particular striking for the autoregressive term, with the estimated parameter
being notably higher using the system estimators. This is consistent with the analysis
of Blundell and Bond (1998). They show that in autoregressive models with persistent
series, the first-diﬀerenced estimator can be subject to serious finite sample biases as a
result of weak instruments, and that these biases can be greatly reduced by the inclusion
of the levels equations in the system estimator. This result is in particular relevant
in the present setting, where the degree of nominal wage rigidity is measured by the
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autoregressive parameter. A first impression therefore favours the system estimators.
However, in the Monte Carlo experiments reported by Blundell and Bond (1998)
only a purely autoregressive process is considered, whereas a more realistic situation
would be cases like the present analysis with additional variables. To gain some further
insight into the properties of the diﬀerent estimators before we proceed, we therefore
conducted a Monte Carlo experiment, using a simplified data generating process(DGP)
more relevant for the analysis at hand. The results of the experiment are fully reported
in the Appendix, but they clearly indicate that the system estimator is to favoured
against the diﬀerence estimator, the latter being severely downward biased for the
coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable. On the basis of the Monte Carlo experi-
ment, the Sys and Sys− end specifications are clearly to be favoured. A further issue
is the exogeneity assumptions. The exogeneity of the explanatory variables in Diff
and Sys in Table 2 are rejected by the Sargan tests, with p-values of 0.008 and 0.0134,
respectively, so this leaves Sys− end as the most reliable candidate.
5 The steady state
The basic hypothesis to be tested was the significance of the parameters of the long-run
solution (4)
wit = β
∗pit + γ∗qit + δ
∗ut + ζ
∗pct.
We now focus on the long-run solution of the estimated equations, using the approach
of Bårdsen (1989). The hypothesis of long-run price homogeneity is rejected in both
diﬀerenced equations, while the systems specifications cannot reject the hypothesis.
But only the Sys− end specification accepts the joint hypothesis of price homogeneity
and proportionality of productivity. Again we therefore end up with Sys− end as the
most reasonable specification. We will therefore use the results from this estimator in
the rest of the paper. The evidence presented in Table 2 does not lend any support
to the hypothesis that the existence of a wage curve is dependent upon ‘modern
European’ features of the labour market. Instead it seems to be the data variation
that traces out the wage curve. The variability of the unemployment rates, both over
time and across industries, is clearly shifting the bargained wage.
Given the turbulent period we are investigating, a relevant question is whether the
wage curve we claim to have found is indeed a genuine relationship, or just eﬀects that
happened to dominate at the end of our sample in 1939. To answer this question we
estimated the steady-state solution recursively, as reported in Figure 69. All parameters
remain stable across the 1930s, with the exception of the eﬀect of retail prices, which
is insignificant until the latter part of the sample. Whether this eﬀect is due to lack of
cross-section variation is an issue that remains to be investigated. We do note, however,
that the eﬀect of retail prices is the parameter most invariant across specifications.
9See also Johansen (1999).
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Figure 6: Recursive estimates of the steady-state parameters
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Figure 7: Levels (logs) of data series, measured quarterly 1980:1 to 2001:1 - (a) unem-
ployment rate (b) annual output (c) nominal wages (d) consumer price index (e) labour
productivity (f) unemployment benefits (g) world output (h) labour force participation
rate (i) gross national expenditure (j) government consumption expenditure.
12
Table 3: Wage equations, GMM system estimates
Dep. var: ∆wit (1) (2)
∆pit −0.10
(0.08)
−
∆qit 0.12
(0.08)
0.19
(0.05)
∆uit 0.007
(0.008)
−
∆pct 0.83
(0.008)
0.62
(0.07)
(w − w∗)i(t−1) −0.18
(0.03)
−0.27
(0.04)
Diagnostics
Sargan: χ2 () 53.39 (110) 54.09 (50)
AR (1) −4.01∗∗ −3.74∗∗
AR (2) −0.07 −0.18
The eﬀect of unemployment on wages is an important issue when analyzing the
interwar labour market. This is in particular the case since the publication of Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1994), who claim to have found an empirical law stating that the
unemployment elasticity of wages is -0.1, so a doubling of unemployment reduces wages
by 10%. We cannot reject that hypothesis on the basis of our data. The test of the
joint hypothesis of a long-run wage curve being homogeneous in prices, proportional to
productivity, and having an unemployment elasticity of -0.1, produces a statistic with
a p-value of 0.27. On the basis of the evidence so far, we therefore test whether the
steady-state solution
wit = 0.5pit + qit − 0.1ut + 0.5pct (5)
χ2(4) = 1.81[0.77],
can be rejected. As the associated p-value in brackets suggests, this empirical rep-
resentation of (4) cannot be rejected. It is therefore imposed when we next turn to
estimating the dynamic specification in the equilibrium-correction form given by (3).10
6 The dynamic model
Having established the existence of a perfectly conventional long-run wage curve for
Norway during the 1927 - 1939 period, we now want to investigate whether the short-
run adjustment of wages during the interwar period diﬀered from what is found in
empirical studies of the postwar period. We could find no such evidence. Our pre-
ferred equation is a quite standard dynamic wage equation, with properties matching
those found in comparable studies of the Norwegian economy during the postwar era.
The relevant evidence is reported in Table 3. Column (1) contains the general model
reparameterized in equilibrium correction form, with the long-run solution (5) imposed.
The short-run eﬀects of producer prices and unemployment are insignificant and can be
dropped–the joint test statistic has a p-value of 0.31. This is of course in accordance
10Note that solving for the NAIRU is not possible without further identifying restrictions–see
Bårdsen and Nymoen (2003) for the details.
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with the corresponding results in Table 1. The final model is reported in column (2).11
There is substantial nominal rigidity, as measured by the EqCM coeﬃcient with a value
of −0.26. Consequently, a drop in inflation is not likely to be reflected in a similar drop
in wage growth, as documented by the coeﬃcient of 0.6 on inflation. These magnitudes
are similar to the evidence from time-series studies using recent Norwegian manufac-
turing data by Nymoen (1989) and Johansen (1995), as well as the panel studies of
Johansen (1996) and Wulfsberg (1997).
It might be argued that it is reasonable that such results dominate in the latter
half of the sample, as Norway recovered from the great depression, but that it does
not necessarily reflect actual behaviour during the depressed years in the early 1930s.
To investigate this possibility we therefore estimated our preferred equation in column
(2) recursively. The estimated coeﬃcients, together with their approximate confidence
bands, are shown in Figure 8, starting with 1932. The coeﬃcients display considerable
stability over time, although there is some downward drift in the coeﬃcient on the
retail price inflation until 1935. Otherwise there is little evidence of changing behaviour
during the sample period.
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DDq 
-2seDDq 
+2seDDq 
 
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
0.50
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+2seDDpc 
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-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
Deqcm(-1) 
-2seDeqcm 
+2seDeqcm 
 
Figure 8: Recursive estimates of the model parameters.
7 Conclusions
Our empirical analysis does not lend any support to the hypothesis of Blanchard and
Katz (1999)–that the presence of a wage curve is due to relatively strong worker
11The change in coeﬃcients partly reflects changes in the list of instruments.
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rights and alternative labour markets. In the case of Norwegian manufacturing indus-
tries during the interwar years, the preferred steady-state wage equation features the
standard properties of homogeneity with respect to prices and productivity, and there
is an unemployment elasticity of -0.1. We also find much inertia in the dynamics of
nominal wages. These results contrast with much of the empirical findings from other
countries; such studies often report diﬃculties with replicating the standard postwar
wage models on interwar data. We believe this result mainly stems from the fact that
we are able to use a panel data set of 55 manufacturing industries in our econometric
analysis, rather than having to rely on a relatively short time series sample.
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A A simulation experiment of the properties of the
estimators
The homoskedastic DGP in Arellano and Bond (1991) is:
yit = αyi,t−1 + βzi1 + ηi + vit, ηi ∼ N[0, 1] vit ∼ N[0, 1]
i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T
zit = ρzi,t−1 + eit, eit ∼ N[0, σ2e].
This DGP is used in Doornik et al. (1999) to illustrate how the system GMM esti-
mator (Sys) gives more precise estimates of the autoregressive parameter α than the
diﬀerenced GMM estimator (Diﬀ ) when α is close to unity. It was also noted that
Diﬀ underestimates α, whereas Sys produces an overestimate. While Doornik et al.
(1999) keep β fixed at unity, we now proceed to keep α fixed at 0.9, and vary β. We
set N = 100, and T = 7 (5 after allowing for lags and diﬀerences).
The two estimators can be summarized as:
transformation regressors instruments estimation
Diﬀ ∆ ∆yi,−1,∆xi,1 diag(yi,t−3yi,t−2),∆xi,1 1-step
Sys ∆ ∆yi,−1,∆xi diag(yi,t−3yi,t−2),∆xi 1-step
levels: yi,−1,xi,1 diag(∆yi,t−2),xi,1
When T = 5, for example, the instruments Z in Diﬀ estimation are:
Zi =
⎛
⎝
yi0 0 0 0 0 ∆xi,2 1
0 yi0 yi1 0 0 ∆xi,3 1
0 0 0 yi1 yi2 ∆xi,4 1
⎞
⎠ .
This assumes that initially the available observations are t = 0, . . . , 4. One observation
is lost owing to the lagged dependent variable, and one more by diﬀerencing. For Sys
estimation the instruments for the diﬀerenced equations (Z∗) and level equations (Z+)
are:
Z∗i =
⎛
⎝
yi0 0 0 0 0 ∆xi,2
0 yi0 yi1 0 0 ∆xi,3
0 0 0 yi1 yi2 ∆xi,4
⎞
⎠ , Z+i =
⎛
⎝
∆yi1 0 0 xi,2 1
0 ∆yi2 0 xi,3 1
0 0 ∆yi3 xi,4 1
⎞
⎠
Some results for M = 1000 Monte Carlo replications are presented in Figure 9.
MCSD is the standard deviation of the estimated αˆ. The results can be compared with
Table 1 of Arellano and Bond (1991) (but we use instruments t− 2, t− 3 instead of all
possible lags from t− 2 onwards), and Table 2 of Blundell and Bond (1998) (but with
larger T , and an additional regressor).
The results are dramatic. Despite the fact that the generated x is kept constant
in replications, the bias of the Diﬀ estimator is enormous for small values of β; for
example when β = 0.3, the mean estimated αˆ is close to 0.5. Sys again overestimates
α, but is much better behaved. These results shed some light on Table 2: the large
discrepancy between the Diﬀ and Sys results reported there corresponds to a low value
of β in Figure 9.
The bias in βˆ is never so dramatic, ranging from about 0.01 to −0.04 for Diﬀ, and
from 0.01 to −0.08 for Sys.
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Figure 9: Mean bias of αˆ, M = 1000, α = 0.9, ρ = 0.8, σ2e = 0.9; bars are twice the
MCSD; β = 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.
B The Data
The wage, price and productivity series are annual data 1927 - 1939 for 55 manu-
facturing industry groups, see Klovland (1999) for further details as to coverage and
sources. The unemployment data are taken from Grytten (1994). These are only avail-
able at a more aggregated level; data for 11 industry groups were distributed on the 55
subgroups. The retail price index is taken from Historical Statistics 1948 (Statistics
Norway, Oslo, 1949).
The data definitions are:
W = nominal hourly earnings Average hourly earnings of (male and female)
production workers, calculated as total wage sum divided by hours worked by produc-
tion workers.
P = producer prices Paasche price index of industry gross output, shifting
base year every third year.
Q = labour productivity Real industry value added divided by total hours
worked. Total hours also include an estimate of hours worked by non-production
workers.
U = unemployment rate based on unemployed registered at public labour ex-
changes, classified by industry groups.
PC = retail price index
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